Increasing the  ICJ\u27s Influence as a Court of Human Rights: The Muslim Rohingya as a Case Study by Deppermann, Lee J.F.
Chicago Journal of International Law 
Volume 14 Number 1 Article 9 
1-6-2013 
Increasing the ICJ's Influence as a Court of Human Rights: The 
Muslim Rohingya as a Case Study 
Lee J.F. Deppermann 
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil 
Recommended Citation 
Deppermann, Lee J.F. (2013) "Increasing the ICJ's Influence as a Court of Human Rights: The Muslim 
Rohingya as a Case Study," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 14: No. 1, Article 9. 
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol14/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please 
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu. 
Increasing the ICJ's Influence as a Court of Human
Rights: The Muslim Rohingya as a Case Study
Lee J.F. Deppermann*
Abstract
Human rights violations continue today at an alarming pace. To appreciate the severiy
of these violations, and the seemingly ineffectual response by the international legal regime, one
need look no further than the persecuted Muslim Rohingya. The Rohingya people, an ethnic
and religious minority in Myanmar, have been the subject of state-sponsored violence foryears,
a trend that continues despite Myanmar's recent moves towards democrag. Two of Myanmar's
neighbors, Thailand and Bangladesh, have contributed to the problem by violating the
international legal princple of non-refoulement. This Comment argues that the InternationalCourt ofJustice can play a larger role in policing and remedying human rghts violations, using
the Muslim Rohingya as a case study. The Court's jurisdictional requirements to hear a
contentious case are stringent, and partiipation in an ICJ case generaly requires the consent of
the states involved. However, several current human rights treaties provide a way to get the
plight of the Rohingya into the Court. Moreover, the Rohingya'splight can also be the subject
of an ICJ advisoy opinion, which would be more difficult than a contentious case to enforce,
but which can be brought before the ICJ with relative ease, and which can be transformed from
soft law to hard law by other international actors.
JD Candidate, 2014, The University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank Eric
Posner and the Chicago Journal of International Law staff for their assistance during the
researching and writing process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The continued persecutions of the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar,
Bangladesh, and Thailand illustrate perhaps the greatest challenge facing modern
international law: the problem of human rights violations. Since the creation of
the United Nations, countless committees, commissions, courts, economic
groups, and non-governmental organizations have been established with the goal
of stopping current violations and preventing future crimes.'
For a brief overview of the history of UN human rights involvement, and the most salient UN
organizations and treaties that deal with human rights, see Tbe United Nations Human Rights System,
(Hum Rts Educ Associates 2003), online at http://www.hrea.org/index.php?base-id=l 63 (visited
Apr 11, 2013).
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For decades Myanmar (formerly Burma) has been among the world's
greatest violators of human rights.2 Ever since a military regime came to power
in Myanmar in the 1960s people throughout the country have been subjected to
mass detentions, arbitrary violence, and oppressive governance. The violence
there continues today, and is directed mostly at the Muslim Rohingya, a religious
and ethnic minority living in the Rakhine region. In addition to being denied
citizenship and enduring persecutions from the government, many Rohingya
have been forced to flee Myanmar. In a breach of international law, the nations
of Bangladesh and Thailand have returned many Rohingya to Myanmar where
they face continued persecution.3
This Comment will argue that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
the capacity under the current international legal regime to take a more active
role in combating human rights violations, providing the persecuted Rohingya
an international forum and remedy in a way that would be otherwise impossible
through the contemporary global human rights regime. To obtain redress, the
Rohingya could be a party, through another state, in an ICJ contentious case.
Although the number of states the Rohingya could bring into such a suit would
be small, and the jurisdictional hurdles would be steep, this would most likely
represent the best chance for compensation and justice. In addition to a more
conventional case, an ICJ advisory opinion would also be of great benefit to the
Rohingya. The advantages here are the inverse of a contentious case: an easier
path to jurisdiction, but more difficult to enforce. Each option brings distinct
advantages and disadvantages, but both provide an opportunity for the ICJ to
address one of the most serious contemporary human rights violations.
In order to establish how the ICJ's strict jurisdictional requirements can be
overcome in a way that provides a meaningful forum for the Rohingya, Section
II will overview the history of human rights violations in Myanmar, and the
atrocities committed most recently by Myanmar, Thailand, and Bangladesh.
Section III will look briefly at the current human rights legal apparatus,
highlighting some of the weaknesses of those systems. Section IV will then
recount the normative reasons why the ICJ can be in a uniquely good position to
address human rights violations.
Next, Section V will analyze several jurisdictional methods that have the
potential to get more human rights cases in front of the ICJ. Although none of
the proposed methods is seamless or without flaws, when taken as a whole, they
broaden the forums available to the international community to address human
rights violations. Section VI will look at the current situation in Myanmar,
addressing how potential litigants could overcome the jurisdictional obstacles
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inherent in contentious cases and advisory opinions and get the case of the
Rohingya before the ICJ. Finally, Section VII will conclude with
recommendations. Although the following analysis of how the Rohingya could
receive a forum in an ICJ contentious case or be the subject of an ICJ advisory
opinion does not absolutely ensure complete justice for the persecuted
Rohingya, it does show how the ICJ can play a more involved role in a human
rights system that is too often failing to address the world's most serious human
rights situations.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN
MYANMAR
Since the 1960s, Myanmar has been isolated from the international
community, having lost access to international trade and other social contacts,
developments that have virtually destroyed its economy.4 The situation
continued to worsen into the 1990s. After a series of democratic protests in
1988, the Myanmar Tatmadaw, a brutal military regime, seized control of
political power and put down all dissidents.' In addition to gaining control of
Myanmar's government, the military government resorted to "widespread use of
forced labor," "religious persecutions" of Muslims, and the "forcible relocation
of civilians.",6 The World Bank responded by suspending economic aid to the
region, hoping to leverage future assistance in order to improve human rights
conditions in Myanmar'
In recent years, Myanmar has begun taking steps toward becoming a more
democratic state, such as freeing a number of (but not all) political prisoners and
loosening restrictions on the state-controlled economy.8 In response, at the
beginning of August 2012, the World Bank took the significant step of
reinstituting aid to Myanmar. Currently, the World Bank is taking steps to open
a new lending office in Myanmar,9 and has just recently approved a multi-million
dollar loan as part of a deal that forgives Myanmar's previous debt to the World
4 Thihan Myo Nyun, Feeling Good or Doing Good- Inefficay of the US Unilateral Sanctions against the
Militag Government ofBurma/Manmar, 7 Wash U Global Studies L Rev 455, 472-74 (2008).
5 Id.
6 Id at 476.
7 Id at 477.
8 The Associated Press, Pariament Passes Foreign Investment Law, NY Times A7 (Sept 8, 2012).
9 World Bank Group Prepares First Grants to Support Myanmar's Reforms (World Bank Group 2012),
online at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/08/01/world-bank-group-prepares-first-
grants-support-myanmar-reforms (visited Apr 11, 2013).
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Bank and the Asian Development Bank.1° This recent action was made possible
by the US modifying its policy to restrict World Bank lending contributions
intended for Myanmar."
But even with these improvements, reports still surface showing that
serious human rights violations continue in Myanmar. These recent persecutions
were directed predominantly at the Rohingya, a Muslim minority living in the
western region of Rakhine. 12 Since 1982, the Rohingya have been denied
citizenship by the government of Myanmar, and were subjected to numerous
governmental abuses.13 Human Rights Watch has reported that the Rohingya
have been subjected to forcible rape, murder, and unjustified mass detention.
The government of Myanmar has done virtually nothing to stop these offenses.
Myanmar is not the only state violating Rohingya human rights. Bangladesh, a
natural stopover for the Rohingya refugees, has allowed some Rohingya to stay,
but has returned many others to Myanmar, 4 violating the international legal
principle of non-refoulement, or assuring refugees protection from being
returned to their former persecutors. Thailand has also refouled Rohingya
refugees, often after the fleeing refugees have undertaken dangerous sea voyages
to escape persecution."5
10 Aye Aye Win, Deal Signed to Clear Myanmar Debt, Allow New Loans, AP (Jan 27, 2013), online at
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2013/01 /27/deal-signed-to-clear-mvanmar-debt-
allow-new-loans (visited Apr 11, 2013).
11 Id. The Obama administration has taken steps to warm relations with Myanmar, including a
presidential visit, and rescinding a longstanding policy not to contribute humanitarian aid to
Myanmar.
12 Human Rights Watch, The Government Could Have Stopped Tbis, Reports 2 (Aug 1, 2012), online at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/08/01/government-could-have-stopped (visited Apr 11,
2013).
13 Jonathan Head, What Drives the Rohingya to Sea? (BBC News Feb 5, 2009), online at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7872635.stm (visited Apr 11, 2013).
14 For a detailed report on the plight of the Rohingya refugees, see Danish Immigration Service,
Rohinga Refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand: FacOfnding Mission to Bangladesh and Thailand
(Copenhagen May 2011), online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,DIS,,BGD,,4ddOd
6f72,0.html (visited Apr 11, 2013).
15 Id. See also Banyan, No Place Like Home: Myanmar's Persecuted Rohingyas Economist (Aug 1, 2012),
online at http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/08/myanmars-persecuted-rohingyas
(visited Apr 11, 2013) and Faine Greenwood, Thailand Deports Rohingya fBoat People.' Despite
International Opposition (Globalpost Jan 4, 2013), online at http://www.globalpost.com/
dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/thailand/130104/thailand-deports-rohingya-boat-people-
despite-Jut (visited Apr 11, 2013).
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III. THE CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Domestic Systems
Any discussion of the current human rights legal framework starts with
domestic systems, as potential litigants have, at least in theory, the option of
initiating court procedures in their own nation's legal system. There are,
however, drawbacks to the use of domestic courts. First, many of the most
frequent human-rights violators will not have a legal system competent (or
motivated) enough to hear human rights complaints.16 Myanmar's legal system,
for example, is in real need of reformation: the courts have been relatively
untouched by recent reforms there, and they are not fully independent from the
military regime.'7 Even commentators who are less critical of the system still
acknowledge that Myanmar would benefit from increased judicial
professionalism and outside influence. 8
Second, the international legal principle of sovereign immunity is a large
roadblock to domestic legal systems taking a more prominent role in human
rights cases. The foundational principle behind sovereign immunity is that states
are presumed equal in the eyes of international law.'9 In the Jurisdictional
16 For a discussion on these issues, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on
Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Monitoring Legal Systems 5, online at http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawMonitoringen.pdf (visited Apr 11, 2013)
(arguing that in post-conflict societies, which are surely the location of many human rights abuses,
legal systems are often "completely dysfunctional" to the extent that it is "unrealistic to expect
immediate compliance by the institutions of justice or ... international standards); The Global
Human Rights Regime (Council on Foreign Relations July 5, 2012), online at http://
www.cfr.org/human-rights/global-human-rights-regime/p27450#p2 (visited Apr 11, 2013)
(noting the connection between democratic governance and the systematic protection of human
rights); and Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court of Human and People's Rights: Better
Late Than Never, 3 Yale Hum Rts & Dev J 45, 50 (2000) (noting that even though many African
nations pass laws to protect human rights their court systems often lack judicial independence and
are unwilling to challenge government actions).
17 Burmese Courts Hand Down Heffy Sentences In Ethnic Clashes (Relief Web Nov 28, 2012), online at
http://reiefweb.int/report/myanmar/burmese-courts-hand-down-hefty-sentences-ethnic-clashes
(visited Apr 11, 2013) (noting that courts are ineffectual despite the fact that special
administrators and overseers were promised to assist judicial involvement in stopping the violence
in Rakhine).
18 See Nyo Nyo Thinn, The Legal System in Myanmar and the Foreign Legal Assistance, 5 L & Dev F
(2006), online at http://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/download.php?fileid
=14558 (visited Apr 11, 2013).
19 See United Nations Charter, Art 2, T 1. For a discussion on the traditional role sovereign
immunity has played in international law, and the inherent tension between an aggressive
international human rights regime and the principle of foreign sovereign immunity, see Jasper
Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?' 21 Eur J Ind L 853 (2011).
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Immunities of the State case,20 the ICJ blocked Italian efforts to have civil claims
against the German state brought in Italian courts. This case set a very recent
and clear precedent that domestic court systems cannot be used as a forum for
complaints against foreign states in cases of human rights abuses.21 This is
significant because, as discussed in Section IV, there are distinct advantages to
bringing human rights suits against states, as opposed to just individuals.2 2
Third, it is often difficult to obtain adequate redress when trying individual
violators of human rights in domestic legal systems. Although the US Alien Tort
Statute23 does allow foreign claimants to bring suits in US district courts against
human rights violators, claimants have to meet specific standards, and damage
awards, which are often extremely large, are usually not efficacious.24 As some
scholars have noted, the US is unusually generous in opening its courts to
human rights cases of this kind, as virtually no other nation allows for similar
domestic jurisdiction over foreign human rights cases.25
B. Regional Human Rights Courts and Institutions
In addition to the legal systems of individual countries, several regional
courts and institutions have claimed jurisdiction over human rights cases. These
include the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR), and the African Court of Human and
People's Rights. Although some of these institutions, especially the ECtHR,
have enjoyed some successes, they are all limited in their ability to cure human
rights defects broadly, particularly in the case of Myanmar.
Their primary defect lies in their limited scope. The most effective of the
courts, the ECtHR is limited to a set of nations that, with only a few exceptions,
20 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Itay: Greece Intervening), 2012 ICJ 143 (Feb 3, 2012).
21 For a discussion of this issue and case, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Germany v Itay; Greece Intervening), 106 Am J Intl L 609, 611 (David P. Stewart, ed) (Feb 3,
2012), online at http://www.icj-Cij.org (visited Apr 14, 2013).
22 See Section IV.
23 28 USCA § 1350 (1948).
24 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Judicial Foreign Poliy We Cannot Afford, Wash Post (Apr
19, 2009), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/17/AR
2009041702859.html (visited Apr 11,2013) (pointing out that large damage awards against foreign
governments and citizens were largely symbolic, with little chance of recovery).
25 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparaive and International Law Anaysis of Domestic Remedies
for International Law Violations, 27 Yale J Intl L 1 (2002). But see Donald Francis Donovan and
Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 Am J Intl L 142, 149
(2006) (suggesting that although no other states have statutes comparable to the Alien Tort
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are not among the world's most consistent human rights violators.26
Furthermore, the Inter-American and African systems, which might include
more human rights violators in their jurisdiction, are not as effective or as
organized as the European system. For instance, the IACHR has heard relatively
few cases,27 and seems to receive comparatively little political support from
member nations. For example, the US and Canada have yet to ratify the Court's
charter document: the American Convention on Human Rights, decreasing the
scope and legitimacy of the court.28
C. The United Nations Human Rights System
Although a complete review of the UN human rights apparatus is
unnecessary to the present analysis, it should be noted that since the creation of
the United Nations, several organizations and offices have been created to
monitor human rights issues around the world.29 In addition to the Security
Council and General Assembly, which have the broad mandate to implement
the UN Charter's protection of human rights, 30 other UN agencies, like the
Economic and Social Council, have also been given the responsibility to make
recommendations-in the case of the Economic and Social Council,
recommendations dealing with international development-that further human
rights.3' The Commission on Human Rights has, among many UN agencies and
bodies that deal with human rights, perhaps the broadest mandate. The
Commission has played a valuable role in both monitoring human rights
situations, and advancing human rights treaties. 32 Although the United Nations is
undoubtedly committed to human rights, these UN bodies have little, if any,
adjudicatory authority, leaving a vacuum in the human rights system to be filled
by a strong international court, like the ICJ.
26 For a reliable list of states that pose the greatest threats to human rights, see US Department of
State, County Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, online at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (visited Apr 11, 2013).
27 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism 211-12 (Oxford 2d ed 2008).
28 American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, 1969, OAS Treaty Ser 36,
OAS, 1978, online at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties B-32_AmericanConvention onHuman
_Rightssign.htm (visited Apr 11, 2013).
29 See The United Nations Human Rights System (cited in note 1).
30 United Nations Charter, Art 13, 1.
31 Id at Art 62, 2. See also United Nations Economic and Social Council, online at
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/index.shtml (visited Apr 11, 2013).
32 United Nations Human Rights Council, Background Information on the Human Rights Council, online at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx (visited Apr 11, 2013).
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D. The International Criminal Court
A relative newcomer to the UN human rights system, the International
Criminal Court (ICC), was established by the Rome Statute in 1998."3 The ICC
has jurisdiction over a limited number of crimes, including genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.3 4 The ICC is a forum
for prosecuting individuals charged with the above crimes. Cases can be brought
to the ICC only when the following jurisdictional requirement is met: 1) a state's
party accepts the ICC's jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed in its
jurisdiction; or 2) in the case of a referral from the ICC prosecutor or by a state,
either the state in which the alleged crime occurred, or the state of which the
accused criminal is a national must have accepted jurisdiction.35 The ICC's
prosecutor has immense discretion to initiate or not initiate criminal
proceedings.36
While, at least in theory, the ICC appears to provide a valid alternative to
domestic and regional systems, several of the Court's weaknesses have prevented
it from significantly altering the international human rights legal framework.
First, the United States has not signed the Rome Statute.3" This weakens the
international legitimacy38 and efficacy 39 of the court, perhaps disincentivizing
other nations to consent to jurisdiction.40 Second, the ICC can only punish
individuals, and it has no jurisdiction over states. 41 As outlined below, the ability
to bring a human rights case against a state brings distinct advantages that are
not had when prosecuting individuals.42 Third, the Court's procedures are long,
33 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UN Treaty Ser No 3 (1998).
34 Id at Art 5.
35 Id at Art 12-16.
36 For a discussion of the ICC prosecutor's discretionary powers, and some suggestions for reform,
see Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Ciminal Court,
33 MichJ Intl L 265 (2012).
37 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (cited in note 33).
38 Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 NY City L Rev 1, 3 (2005).
39 See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U Chi L Rev 89, 101 (2003)
(noting the "indispensability" of US might to the success of international tribunals).
40 One commentator has noted that "rt]he US could provide increased funding, international
prestige, and widespread acceptance of the ICC's jurisdictional authority, thereby legitimizing the
fledgling Court in the international community, giving teeth to its mandate and facilitating
effective enforcement." Kielsgard, 8 NY City L Rev at 10 (cited in note 38).
41 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court at Art 1 (cited in note 33) (declaring that it
"shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for [violations of] the most serious
crimes of international concern") (emphasis added).
42 See Section IV.
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which may reduce the retributive effects and disincentives associated with
prosecuting international criminals.43
IV. THE ICJ AS A COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: NORMATIVE
ADVANTAGES
Many commentators have observed that the ICJ is not the ideal forum for
human rights cases. 44 Indeed, many of the Court's most prominent and useful
cases have dealt with territorial disputes and similar questions that have little
bearing on human rights law. One scholar has remarked that the "ICJ is not a
specialized human rights institution, either in terms of its mandate, its
jurisdiction, its procedures, or its personnel. Each of these elements may well
limit the Court's future role in the human rights arena. However, it is
undeniable that the ICJ has played a role in the formation of international
human rights law, through both contentious rulings and advisory opinions."
Furthermore, as the centerpiece of the UN legal system, the ICJ can play an
expanded role in international human rights norms and litigation. For the
following reasons, one can argue that, normatively speaking, the ICJ has the
capacity to be a powerful forum for future human rights issues.
A. Broad International Participation
The vast majority of the world's nations are part of the UN system, many
more than any other regional or international human rights court or
organization.4' This fact alone inevitably brings a larger number of nations into
discussions about human rights violations. This is the case partially, if nothing
43 See, for example, Alison Cole and Kelly Askin, Thomas Lubanga: War Crimes Conviction in the First
Case at the International Criminal Court, 16 Am Socy Intl L 12 (Mar 27, 2012), online at
http://www.asil.org/insights120327.cfm (visited Apr 13, 2013) (noting the long gap between the
initiation of the proceedings and the final resolution); Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Prosecutors Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 2012 1CC, ICC-01/04-01/06 (Mar 14, 2012).
44 See, for example, Stephen M. Schwebel, Human Rights in the World Court, 24 Vand J Transnati L
945, 946 (1991) (stating that the ICJ "is not a human rights court in the contemporary sense of
that term" and pointing out that the majority of cases and advisory opinions issued by the ICJ
have not dealt with human rights); Natalia Lucak, Note, Georgia v Russian Federation: A Question of
the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 27 Md J Intl L 323 (2012) (arguing that the ICJ has
recently foreclosed another opportunity to take an expanded role in human rights litigation).
45 John R. Crook, The International Court ofJustice and Human Rights, 1 Nw Intl J Hum Rts 2 (2003).
46 For a discussion of how the PCIJ and ICJ have contributed to human rights norms, see Schwebel,
24 Vand J Transnatl L at 946 (cited in note 44).
47 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice, online at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TRE
ATY&mtdsg-no=-1&chapter= 1 &ang=en (visited Apr 13, 2013).
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else, because the UN General Assembly can refer legal matters to the ICJ for a
legal opinion.4" Relatedly, the US is a very prominent and influential member of
the UN system, and because the UN Security Council has the ability to enforce
ICJ judgments, the US's involvement will be both needed and salutary, especially
considering the leading role the US undertook in both of the Security Council's
authorizations of force: the Korean War and the first Iraq War.49
B. Enforceability through the Security Council
The UN Security Council has a legal right and obligation to enforce ICJ
rulings.50 This means that UN member states with an interest in stopping human
rights violations will have a clear legal avenue if they choose to intercede
militarily. Although this inquiry leans toward policy and away from the law, in
some respects, it is worth noting. There is a credible argument that the UN
Security Council could enforce an ICJ ruling without having to issue an
authorization of force, the latter avenue being rare and politically difficult.
Further, these rulings would allow nations to intervene militarily without having
to illustrate that they are acting in collective self-defense,5 which is also often
difficult politically.
C. Ability to Employ Preliminary Measures
The ICJ can issue provisional measures, a type of preliminary injunction. 2
The court can grant a provisional measure at the request of either party or on its
own initiative. Giving further weight to provisional measures, the ICJ statute
requires that the Court notify the UN Security Council of its issuance of these
preliminary measures.5 3 While there is little Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) 4 or ICJ precedent directly on point, provisional measures can be
48 See Section JV.B.2.
49 For an additional discussion of the US's broad role in the human rights system, see Curtis A.
Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U Pa L Rev 399,
411-16 (2000) (exploringin part the US relationship with many of the major human rights treaties
enacted in the wake of World War 11). For a view that is more openly critical, see Louis Henkin,
US Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am J Intl L 341 (1995).
5o United Nations Charter, Art 41, 59.
51 See id at Art 2, 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'); and id at Art 51 ("Nothingin
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense ... .
52 Id at Art 41
53 Id.
54 The Permanent Court of International Justice, operating from 1922 to 1948, was the predecessor
court to the ICJ and was part of the League of Nations system. See Permanent Court of
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seen as enough legal authority to authorize UN action to stop the abuses.
Although some of the legal questions surrounding provisional measures are not
completely settled,"5 the ICJ has ruled that they are legally binding. In the
LaGrand Case (Germany v United States),6 the ICJ held that provisional measures
are legally binding because if they were not binding, it would defeat the purpose
of Article 41 -of the JCJ statute.
Provisional measures are, however, still subject to the jurisdictional
procedures required for the court to hear a contentious case. 7 Requests for
provisional measures often accompany the initial application by a party to the
ICJ. Thus, the decision to issue a provisional measure and accept jurisdiction are
frequently intertwined, with the former often conditioned on the latter. But
there is some leeway; in Georgia v Russian Federation,8 the ICJ held that "the Court
need not finally satisfy itself ... that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case"
in order to issue a provisional measure, and could issue an injunction in the
absence of a definitive jurisdictional ruling if "the [jurisdictional arguments]
invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the
jurisdiction of the Court might be founded." 9 Provisional measures are thus a
powerful tool that potential applicants can use to encourage the ICJ to respond
to human rights violations. Human rights violations are usually urgent situations,
such that the ICJ would feel compelled to act immediately. Even if eventual
jurisdiction is denied, a provisional measure may be enough to allow intervening
nations the opportunity to stop the violence.
D. The Ability to Bring Suits Against States
The ICJ can hear cases involving states that violate international human
rights norms, a complement to the ICC, which can only hear complaints against
International Justice, Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, online
at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/index.php?pl=9 (visited Apr 13, 2013). The PCIJ and ICJ have
similar statutes, and the ICJ has occasionally referenced PCIJ decisions, and has also used
Optional Clause declarations for the PCIJ as sufficient to grant jurisdiction in ICJ cases. See
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, online at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/40421d5e4.html (visited Apr 13, 2013).
55 For a brief overview of ICJ provisional measures, see Alexandra C. Traviss, Note, Temple of Preah
Vihear Lessons on Provisional Measures, 13 Chi J Ind L 317, 320-24 (2012).
56 LaGrand Case (Germany v United States) Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, 9 ICJ
Reports, 14-15 (1999). For rules on interpreting treaties, see Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331, Art 32 (1980), online at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/conventions/ 11 1969.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2013).
57 See Section V.A.
58 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v
Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 Oct 2008, 941 ICJ Reports 353, 354 (2008).
59 Id at 377.
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individuals. This is significant because states have the capacity, at least in theory,
of offering the kinds of restitution that simply cannot be ordered from the
prosecution of an individual. The 1CJ can give a financial damage award to the
"victorious" party in human rights litigation and even in the absence of a specific
damage award, once the Court signals that it will give an entitlement to one party
over the other, the door opens for the two parties to arbitrate a settlement
themselves.6 °
There is a good normative argument to be made that a financial damage
award is superior to criminal sanctions. Criminal sanctions lose their retributive
and disincentivizing qualities when the punishment is far removed in time from
the initial crime. 6 Further, scholarship has yet to demonstrate (possibly due to
the short existence of the ICC and the few final rulings it has handed down) that
there is actually a deterrent effect to ICC criminal punishments. Relatedly, there
is a good argument that financial damage awards are better for victims. 62
Although making full restitution for human rights violations is almost inherently
impossible, a financial award may have a much larger effect on the victim's
quality of life than an ICC prosecution could. For example, victims of forced
detention or non-refoulement laws can receive money awarded as damages and
use those funds to purchase new dwellings or other basic necessities.
V. JURISDICTION AND THE ICJ
All of the ICJ's normative advantages are, of course, irrelevant without a
way of getting human rights issues brought before the Court. Indeed, the ability
to bring human rights cases in front of a court that places consent at the center
of its jurisdictional grants is challenging, to say the least. The ICJ can hear cases
in two different types of forums: contentious cases and advisory opinions.
Because ICJ contentious cases can only be brought against a state that consents,
the jurisdictional prerequisites block many potential cases from getting into the
Court. ICJ advisory opinions also have jurisdictional rules that can be
challenging, but can be fairly easy to overcome in the human rights context.
60 See Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court ofJustice and the Law of the
United Nations, 6 Eur J Intl L 539 (1995) (noting that agreements between states, and self help
actions, remain prominent when enforcing ICJ judgments).
61 Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a lag) Punishment: Equitable Sentencng and the Implications of Discounting,
Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 552 (2007) online at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
fss papers/552 (visited Apr 13, 2013) (arguing that because criminals discount the future the lag
between the commission of a crime and the imposition of a punishment decreases the deterrence
and retributive value of the sentence).
62 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights law (Oxford 1999), in Richard B. Bilder and
Beth Stephens, Book Reviews and Notes, 95 Am J Intl L 257-60 (2001) (discussing the benefits of
both compensatory and punitive damages in human rights violations).
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A. Contentious Cases
Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice establishes
the basic jurisdictional rules for bringing a contentious case before the ICJ. 63
Contentious cases are the types of formal adjudications familiar to most legal
systems, with a panel of ICJ judges receiving written briefs and hearing oral
arguments before giving an entitlement to one party and issuing a formal legal
opinion.64 There are four primary ways in which a case can meet the ICJ's
consent requirements and be heard on the merits as a contentious case.
First, parties may base their claim on jurisdiction by special agreement. 65
Once a dispute arises between two states they may agree to submit the matter to
the ICJ. These agreements and submissions formally consent to jurisdiction and
also define the scope of the issues in which the parties want the ICJ to decide.66
Second, parties may base their jurisdictional claim on a dispute resolution
clause in a treaty.67 Many international treaties, both bilateral and multilateral,
contain clauses referring any disputes that may arise under the treaty to the ICJ.
Although these referral clauses are common in treaties, reservations,
understandings, and declarations (RUDs) are almost as common. RUDs are
frequently used by states to define the individual states' commitments under, and
understandings of, the treaty agreement. Many states include RUDs that
specifically exempt that state from mandatory ICJ referral clauses.
68
Although many states use RUDs of this nature to escape the consequences
of breaching their treaty obligations, the ICJ itself has upheld the use of RUDs
to circumvent this jurisdictional avenue. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democralic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda),69 Rwanda
argued that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction because it attached an RUD to the
Genocide Convention, the treaty giving jurisdiction to the ICJ. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) argued that to allow the reservation would be
incompatible with the purpose of the Genocide Convention. The ICJ disagreed
with the DRC, holding that the RUD dealt with the jurisdiction of the court and
63 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 36 (cited in note 47).
64 For a detailed look into the basic procedural structure of the ICJ, see id at Arts 39-64.
65 Id at Art 36 1.
66 Id at Art 40.
67 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 40 (cited in note 47).
68 See Section VI.A.2 for examples in this context.
69 Armed Activities on the Teritogy of the Congo (New Appa'cation: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v
Rwanda), 2006 iCJ 6, 30-33 (Feb 3, 2006).
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not the substantive obligations under the Genocide Convention, and thus the
RUD did not defeat the treaty's purpose.70
Third, parties may bring their case before the Court if they have consented
to jurisdiction in advance under the Optional Clause of the Statute of the ICJ. 71
In doing this, states consent to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction over any claim that
deals with an international legal dispute. The ICJ statute treats declarations
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) as Optional Clause declarations for purposes of Article 36(2).2
Although some nations have consented to Optional Clause jurisdiction, most
have not, and the United Kingdom is the only permanent member of the UN
Security Council that has consented.73
Finally, states can assent to jurisdiction through a method called forum
propogatum, which is closely related to the "special agreement" method7 4
Through this avenue, a party submits a dispute to the ICJ without working out
an agreement with the other state beforehand. Following the petition from the
single state, the court cannot take action or begin proceedings until the other
state consents to jurisdiction. Although the Rules of the Court, upon which thisjurisdictional grant is regulated, came into force in 1978,forumpropogatum was not
used until 2003, when France consented to jurisdiction after the Republic of the
Congo filed an application that was later designated Certain Criminal Proceedings in
France (Republic of the Congo v France).75
B. Advisory Opinions
In addition to its more conventional jurisdiction in contentious cases, the
ICJ has the ability under the UN Charter,76 and its own statute, 7 to issue
advisory opinions on legal issues. Advisory opinions are issued at the request of
either multiple states seeking a legal opinion in the course of dispute resolution,
or by an authorized organization, and are issued by the Court without a trial-type
70 Id.
71 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 36 2 (cited in note 47).
72 See generally Rules of the International Court of Justice, online at http://www.icj-cij.org/
documents/index.php?pl =4&p2 =3&p3=0 (visited Apr 13, 2013).
73 See International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as
Compulsory, onine at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2= 1&p3 =3 (visited
Apr 13, 2013).
74 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 36 5 (cited in note 47).
75 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v France), Application Instituting
Proceedings, 2003 ICJ (Apr 11, 2003).
76 United Nations Charter, Art 96.
77 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 65 (cited in note 47).
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event or procedure. 8 The UN General Assembly and Security Council, along
with other UN agencies and organizations, may request advisory opinions,
though the ICJ has required that UN organizations submit only legal questions
that arise out of their respective scopes and expertise. In 1993, for example, the
World Health Organization (WHO) requested an ICJ advisory opinion on
whether, considering the probable health effects of detonating a nuclear device,
the use of nuclear weapons would be a breach of international law. The ICJ
declined to give an opinion, stating that:
The question put to the Court in the present case relates, however, not to
the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the
use of such weapons ... Whatever those effects might be, the competence
of the WHO to deal with them is not dependent on the legality of the acts
that caused them."79
While this strict requirement to stay within the confines of a department's
expertise and purview may restrict the ability of UN agencies and organizations
to request advisory opinions on human rights, it does not similarly restrict the
Security Council or General Assembly. Article 96 of the UN Charter states
"[t]he General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International
Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question."'
Discussions about the legal effect of advisory opinions are complicated.
On one hand, the ICJ stands on unquestionably stable legal ground when issuing
an advisory opinion on any question relating to international law, including
human rights situations, when requested to do so by the Security Council or
General Assembly. History has shown that the ICJ does not hesitate to issue
advisory opinions in politically sensitive circumstances, 81 a trend that could be
useful when the Court addresses human rights issues. Some scholars, however,
have questioned the legal status of advisory opinions, noting that on their own,
they are not binding in the absence of state consent, but that states can agree to
treat advisory opinions as binding. 2 Even though such advisory opinions are not
independently legally binding, many argue that they still have considerable legal
effect. One scholar noted that ICJ advisory opinions have can be efficacious
"because the legal reasoning embodied in them reflects the Court's authoritative
78 See id at Arts 65-68.
79 Advisory Opinion No 679, Legakity of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 ICJ
66, 76, 80 (July 8,1996).
80 United Nations Charter, Art 96 (emphasis added).
81 Julie Calidonio Schmid, Advisogry Opinions on Human Rights: Moving ByondA Pyrrhic Victoy, 16 Duke
J Comp & Intl L 415, 427 (2006).
82 For an example, see Barry E. Carter and Allen S. Weiner, International Law 329 (Wolters Kluwer
6th ed 2011) (noting that states can consent to follow advisory opinions, making them legally
binding).
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views on important issues of international law and in arriving at them, the Court
follows essentially the same rules and procedures that govern its binding
judgments delivered in contentious cases submitted to it by sovereign states. An
advisory opinion derives its status and authority from the fact that it is the
official pronouncement of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations."83
VI. THE ICJ AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR
A. The Possibility of a Contentious Case Before the ICJ
A contentious case filed with the ICJ would probably represent the
Rohingya's best chance for redress. The government of Myanmar is certainly
liable for most of the human rights abuses, but any legal proceeding in front of
the ICJ could draw in the nations of Bangladesh and Thailand, who have, in
turn, violated the international principle of non-refoulement by forcing refugees
to return to Myanmar. Because the rights at issue here are human rights norms,
many of which have reached the status ofjus cogens, or universal norms, and are
thus affronts to the entire international community, 84 it is both proper and
necessary that another nation bring up the cause of the Rohingya before the ICJ.
1. Jurisdiction by special agreement or under the optional clause.
Although it is legally possible to bring a contentious case to the ICJ by
special agreement, the practical odds of accomplishing this, or finding
jurisdiction under the Optional Clause, are extremely low. First, Myanmar,
Thailand, and Bangladesh have not consented to automatic ICJ jurisdiction
under the Optional Clause.8" Second, there is no recognizable legal framework
that can force those nations, including Myanmar, to accept jurisdiction by special
agreement. Although Myanmar is, in many ways, democratizing and receiving
the benefits of increased connection to the West, it would undoubtedly be
hesitant to consent to jurisdiction when the facts implicate Myanmar so clearly.
Of course, there are possible political and diplomatic options that could be
explored to coax Myanmar to accept jurisdiction by special agreement, some
83 Pieter H.F. Bekker, The UN General Assembly Requests a World Court Admsogy Opinion On Israels
Separation Barrier, (ASIL Insights, December 2003), online at http://www.asil.org/insigh121.
cfm#_ednref2l (visited Apr 13, 2013).
84 For a general discussion of how international law has come to embrace individual rights, see
Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32
Am U L Rev 1, 14-18 (1982).
85 See International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as
Compulsory, online at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl= 5&p2=l&p3=3 (visited
Apr 13, 2013) (cited in note 73).
Summer 2013
Deppermann
Chicago Journal of International Law
kind of quid pro quo perhaps, but that inquiry is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
2. Jurisdiction through a referral clause in an applicable treaty.
Looking at applicable human rights treaties and conventions is the next
logical step in the process of getting the Rohingya's case in front of the ICJ in
the form of a contentious case. The Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees" and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees8 7 is a natural place to
begin the inquiry, as the Protocol contains provisions on non-refoulement and
the overall status of refugees, violations that apply to all three of the nations in
question. However, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand are not signatories to
either the Convention88 or the Protocol.89
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 9 is another natural place to look for both a cause of action and grant
of jurisdiction. It is nearly certain, given that they are both an ethnic and
religious minority in Myanmar, that the Rohingya could be seen as a group
falling within the Convention's protection; that is, "a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group." 91 Further, the nation that brings the claim on behalf of the
Rohingya could argue that by returning refugees with the knowledge that they
would be persecuted, Bangladesh and Thailand are complicit in genocide, a
crime provided for in the Genocide Convention.9 2 Although Thailand is not a
party, both Myanmar and Bangladesh have signed and ratified the convention.93
However, Myanmar included in its signature and RUD stating that "nothing
contained in the said Article shall be construed as depriving the Courts and
Tribunals of the Union of jurisdiction or as giving foreign Courts and tribunals
jurisdiction over any cases of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
86 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UN Treaty Set No 137 (1951).
87 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UN Treaty Ser No 267 (1967).
88 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee (cited in note 86). See list of signatories online at
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=V-2&chapter=5
&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en (visited Apr 13, 2013).
89 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, (cited in note 87). See list of signatories online at
http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src= treaty&mtdsg-no=V-5&chapter= 5&lang=en
(visited Apr 13, 2013).
90 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UN Treaty Ser No
277 (1948).
91 Id at Art 2.
92 Id at Art 3.
93 For a list of signatories, see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (cited in note 90), online at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TRE
ATY&mtdsg__no=IV-l&chapter=4&lang=cn (visited Apr 13,2013).
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Article III committed within the Union territory," 4 effectively blocking ICJ
jurisdiction. Bangladesh similarly declared: "For the submission of any dispute in
terms of this article to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the
consent of all parties to the dispute will be required in each case." 95
The UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 96 is
another possible cause of action and source of jurisdiction. Thailand has signed
the convention, but has declared (through an RUD) exemption from the referral
clause.9 Significantly, Bangladesh has ratified the treaty without any RUDs,
opening itself up to ICJ jurisdiction through the Convention.98 Article 22 of that
Convention refers disputes between two parties to the ICJ.99 Because the
Rohingya can be classified as an ethnic group, they receive protection under the
Convention according to Article 1 of the agreement. 0 Thus, a party that brings
a suit on behalf of the Rohingya could find both a cause of action and grant of
jurisdiction with respect to a suit involving Bangladesh.
Another potential source is the UN Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 1 Article 30 of
that Convention provides for international arbitration and referral to the ICJ if
states parties are involved in a dispute concerning the convention. 112 Myanmar is
not a state party to the Convention, but Thailand and Bangladesh are parties."3
Of the two, only Thailand exempted itself from Article 30's referral of disputes
to the ICJ.104 Thus, as with the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UN
Treaty Ser 195 (1996).
97 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UN
Treaty Ser No 195, Declarations and Understandings, online at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg.no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (visited Apr
14, 2013).
98 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UN
Treaty Ser No 195, list of signatories online at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (visited Apr 13, 2013).
99 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination at 236-38 Art
22 (cited in note 96).
100 Id at Art 1.
101 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
1465 UN Treaty Ser No 85 (1984).
102 Id at Art 30.
103 For a list of signatories, see id, online at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (visited Apr 13, 2013).
104 Id at Declarations and Understandings, online at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (visited Apr 13, 2013).
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Discrimination, a potential litigant nation could use the UN Torture Convention
as a source of jurisdiction and a cause of action in a suit against Bangladesh on
behalf of the Rohingya.
B. The Applicability and Utility of an ICJ Advisory Opinion
The situation in Myanmar, and perhaps the international human rights
cause as a whole, could greatly benefit from an ICJ advisory opinion issued on
the subject of the Rohingya persecutions in Myanmar, and the non-refoulement
violations committed by Bangladesh and Thailand. This advisory opinion could
address the legal questions of whether Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand have
violated a principle of international law that binds those individual nations, and
it could define the potential legal remedies for those violations.
1. Sources of law that the ICJ could draw upon.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention) and the 1967 Protocol (the Refugee Protocol) were based in part
on the principle of non-refoulement, a guarantee that refugees will not be forced
to return to their former place of inhabitation if they will face further
persecution or inhumane treatment. 10 5 The Convention specifically states that
"[nio Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.
' 106
The ICJ, in issuing an advisory opinion, could also draw upon the human
rights principles articulated in the UN Charter. As participants in the UN
system, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand have ratified the UN Charter.
10 7
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter obligate member nations to promote, among
other things, "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion."' 18 Although not legally binding, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights can also be seen as expressing some aspects of customary international
law, if anything because it is often seen as "an authoritative interpretation of the
U.N. Charter... [constituting] part of the constitutional structure of the world
community."'
10 9
105 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees at Art 33 (cited in note 86).
106 Id.
107 See United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, online at http://www.un.org/en/
members/index.shtmI (visited Apr 14, 2013).
108 United Nations Charter, Art 55-56.
109 Sohn, 32 Am U L Rev at 14-17 (cited in note 84).
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Because the governments of Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand have not
signed some of the treaties that establish basic norms of human rights, the ICJ
would have an acute need to draw upon customary international law in issuing
an advisory opinion. According to Restatement of the Law (Third), the Foreign
Relations of the United States, "[c]ustomary international law results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."' 10 Many scholars argue that despite the relative prevalence of human
rights violations across the international community, the legal norms embodied
in the most important human rights treaties and agreements have become settled
customary international law."'
Thus, the ICJ would have ample source of law to draw on when issuing an
advisory opinion. The legal questions in this dispute are not complicated; rather,
the real issue is jurisdictional, requiring a way to give credence and legitimacy to
an ICJ advisory opinion on the Rohingya.
2. Jurisdiction and an ICJ advisory opinion.
As recounted above, there are jurisdictional hurdles to surmount when
attempting to obtain an advisory opinion by the ICJ. If the opinion is requested
by a state, the other state or states involved must consent to the opinion." 2 In
any event, if we assume that the nations in question here-Myanmar,
Bangladesh, and Thailand-will not consent to a contentious case, it is
reasonable to assume that they will also likely not consent to an advisory
opinion.
However, the UN agencies empowered to request an advisory opinion will
have both the interest and the purview to request an opinion. Even though
neither the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights nor the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees are on the list of UN agencies or
110 Restatement (Third), The Foreign Relations of the United States, 5 102(2) (1987).
111 See Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism at 37-38 (cited in note 27) (arguing that
consistent state practice is no longer the best barometer for gauging whether a legal norm has
achieved customary practice, and claiming that customary international law has claimed many of
the most important human rights legal norms). But see Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Prindples, 12 Ausd YB Intl L 82, 82-85
(1989) (arguing for a more traditional view of customary international law).
112 As a side matter, there have been recent, persuasive proposals to allow a single state to request an
advisory opinion that deals with a legal dispute with another state, without having to amend the
UN Charter or Statute of the ICJ. See Andrew Strauss, Cuting the Gordian Knot: How and Whj the




Chicago Journal of International Law
specialized bodies that can request an advisory opinion," 3 that fact is not likely
to be detrimental to the cause of the Rohingya. This is so primarily because the
General Assembly, although not empowered to issue binding statements of law
itself, can request an ICJ advisory opinion. " 4
In the past, the General Assembly has not hesitated to request advisory
opinions on either politically controversial cases or human rights issues.
Examples include the Construction of a Wall opinion,'1 5 where the ICJ was asked to
opine on the legality of the separation wall being built in Israel; the opinion in
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,"6
which grappled with state compliance with the Genocide treaty; and the Legalit
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons opinion,"7 in which the ICJ was asked to
rule on the legality of nuclear weapons.
There is good reason to think that the General Assembly could or would
request an advisory opinion in the case of the Rohingya. First, given the
foregoing discussion on the General Assembly's willingness to request advisory
opinions on sensitive issues, the politically charged nature of the situation in
Myanmar, made more salient with the loosening of restrictions on trade and aid
from the West, would probably not prevent the General Assembly request.
Second, the General Assembly has been monitoring interest in the human rights
situation in Myanmar. The Assembly has consistently issued resolutions on the
human right situation in Myanmar," 8 with the most recent resolution expressing
concern at continuing violations, and declaring that they will continue to
monitor the matter." 9
3. Soft law and the enforcement of an ICJ advisory opinion.
Although obtaining an advisory opinion that addresses the plight of the
Rohingya could be relatively easy, giving that advisory opinion legal efficacy is a
113 International Court of Justice, Organs and Agencies of the United Nations Authorized to Request Advisoy
Opinions, online at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl =5&p2=2&p3=1 (visited Apr
13, 2013).
114 Id.
115 Advisory Opinion No 883, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Temitogy, 2004 ICJ (July 9, 2004).
116 Advisory Opinion No 59, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 ICJ (May 28, 1951).
117 Advisory Opinion No 679, Legaliy of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ (July 8, 1996)
(cited in note 79).
118 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, see list of
resolutions online at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage.-e.aspx?b=3&c=125&t=ll (visited
Apr 13, 2013).
119 Id.
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more difficult matter, though not impossible. The difficulty comes in trying to
convert the "soft law" nature of an ICJ advisory opinion ("soft" because it is not
predicated on the consent of the states involved) into "hard law," or a norm that
is binding on the participants, much like contentious case decisions are.120
There are, in effect, two ways in which aspects of soft law, like an 1CJ
advisory opinion, can crystalize into hard law. First, the legal principles or
reasoning used in the opinion can be given legal status. For example, the ICJ
could hold in an advisory opinion that certain features of international
humanitarian or treaty law have reached the status of customary international
law. In this way, the ICJ could convert soft law assumptions about human rights
obligations into clearer legal norms that have the capacity to influence future
legal decisions.
Secondly, an ICJ advisory opinion could lose its status as soft law and
become hard law if another agency or government gives it the force of hard law
by adopting it, or if the nations involved voluntarily choose to accept the
provisions of the advisory opinion. This aspect of soft law is much more
pertinent to this Comment's analysis because, as shown above, finding sources
of law in relevant treaties or in customary international law will not be
prohibitively challenging. Rather, the practical difficulty lies in connecting an ICJ
advisory opinion to redress for the Rohingya.
Legal scholarship is prone to address the issue of soft law's enforceability
in two distinct ways. First, some scholars point out that to fully understand soft
law's legal effects one must have "an understanding of compliance and the
impact of international law that goes beyond traditional doctrinal approaches." 121
In this calculus, the effectiveness of any rule of international law is best
understood by evaluating how the mechanisms of reputation, reciprocity, and
retaliation follow the imposition of the rule."2 Thus, a legal rule, hard or soft,
that damages the reputation of a non-compliant state sufficient to incentivize
that state to comply is effective. Similarly, if a non-compliant state risks negative
consequences from other states' non-compliance or from direct retaliatory
action from other states then the legal rule is considered binding. Some
scholarship has gone so far as to suggest that soft law rules may have more
efficacy in areas like human rights because even though they reduce their
"compliance pull," they include more states in their scope in the first place.'23
120 See Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers:(HalJ)Truths and Consequences,38 Tex Intl LJ 405, 427
(2003).
121 Andrew T. Guzman and Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft Law of International
Tribunals, 9 Chi J Intl L 515, 526 (2009).
122 Id at 527.
123 Id at 532.
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Another way of looking at soft law is to define it more narrowly,
distinguishing it from both political agreements on one side of the international
legal spectrum and hard law, on the other end of the scale.'24 In this analysis, soft
law is given a binding character because it can create legal obligations through
another treaty or international convention, or though domestic law, even though
on its own it is unable to command compliance."'
In analyzing the efficacy of an ICJ advisory opinion that addresses the
plight of the Rohingya by detailing the applicable violations of international law
and outlining what kind or level of compensation would address those legal
violations, it is possible to look at both of the above frameworks. It is clear, as
stated above, that because Myanmar is taking increased steps to reintegrate into
the global community, including receiving aid from the World Bank,126 it is not
unreasonable to assume that they would be more susceptible to the reputational
and retaliatory effects described above. Although it is easy to dismiss this
analysis as purely political, it is worth noting that, under this framework, all
international law can be seen this way."'
It is equally clear that the second framework is applicable here. If an
international organization-like the General Assembly, the Security Council, or
the World Bank-adopted an ICJ advisory opinion as binding or persuasive, the
advisory opinion gains the same force of law as any other act by that body. For
example, the World Bank could adopt an advisory opinion as evidence in
weighing whether or not to continue to aid, or extend current aid, to Myanmar,
Bangladesh, and Thailand.128 Of course, the Security Council could always adopt
the advisory opinion as binding, although the politically charged nature of that
body makes it less likely to adopt an advisory opinion than the General
Assembly.1
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As the foregoing analysis makes clear, presenting the plight of the
Rohingya to the international community via the ICJ would certainly be a
difficult and formidable task, but not an impossible one. Potential jurisdictional
avenues exist in both contentious cases and advisory opinions. The ICJ has
distinct advantages when compared with other international and domestic
human rights institutions. The Court enjoys the support and participation of a
broad swath of nations, including most of the Western powers, and its
procedures could help secure the Rohingya preliminary relief and a chance to
have sufficient compensation debated on the world stage.
Options for a contentious case are limited, but they do exist. A nation
pursuing an opinion on behalf of the Rohingya could bring Bangladesh before
the 1CJ under the referral clauses of the UN Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the UN Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This may
seem like a hollow victory, as it would include only one of the nations that have
broken the legal principle of non-refoulement, and it would not include the
government of Myanmar, which is certainly the most culpable party involved.
The situation brightens when considering a potential ICJ advisory opinion.
The General Assembly could easily call for an advisory opinion in the absence of
state initiation and consent. Furthermore, the substantive legal obligations
involved in humanitarian and refugee law are not complicated. Even though the
nations involved have significantly hedged their commitment to human rights
through treaties, enough human rights norms have reached customary status to
provide the ICJ with plenty of applicable law to draw upon in an advisory
opinion.
As with any act of international adjudication, enforcement of an advisory
opinion will be problematic. If Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand are
unwilling to consent to jurisdiction by special agreement in a contentious case,
they will, unless the advisory opinion is more favorable than expected, probably
not consent to be bound by an advisory opinion. However, there are other ways
to lend legal weight to an advisory opinion. First, individual nations could draw
upon the recommendations contained in an advisory opinion when crafting their
own diplomatic relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand. Second, a
UN agency, like the World Bank, can incorporate the advisory opinion into its
own decision-making, effectively giving full legal effect to what would otherwise
only be soft law. In addition, the UN General Assembly, though not a body that
can itself issue legally binding resolutions, can increase the statute and
international recognition of the opinion. Finally, the Security Council itself can
take action rooted in the advisory opinion.
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In conclusion, human rights violations will likely continue to vex the
international legal community. With a human rights system that is fragmented
among domestic courts, regional institutions, and the UN system, the
enforcement of human rights norms will be sporadic and inconsistent at best.
Although the ICJ will never truly be a "court of human rights" in the true sense
of the phrase, it can take greater action against human rights violators-the
persecuted Rohingya would be a welcome starting point.
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